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Abstract
According to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement concluded with 
the European Union, the process of the integration of the Republic of Serbia 
into the European Union includes an obligation to introduce rules on the con-
trol of state aid in the country and for that purpose to establish an operationally 
independent authority entrusted with the powers necessary to implement in 
full the state aid rules on a national level. The aim of this paper is to examine 
models of state aid control mechanism that have been developed in various EU 
Member States, which were required to establish such control mechanisms as 
part of the EU accession process, and to consider challenges and prospects of 
reforming Serbian institutional setting.  The paper concludes that the identifi-
cation of the appropriate form of institutional setup for state aid control must 
take account of national specificities - particular the stage within the transition 
process reached by the country in question, the level of economic transforma-
tion undertaken before enactment of reforms, the role of independent bodies 
within the legal system as well as the overall societal and political context.
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Introduction 
The introduction of state aid control is a crucial factor in the trans-
formation of former planned economies, in which government involve-
ment and the role of business was one of the crucial features of the system 
(Gros, Steinherr 2004).3 The Stabilisation and Association Agreements 
(SAAs) concluded over the past decade between (potential) candidates 
and the European Union and its Member States require candidate coun-
tries to develop an “operationally independent” body charged with con-
trolling state aid granting. Institutional design and detailed procedural 
rules are left to the individual candidate countries (prospective Member 
States). The standard of “operational independence” is still to be fully 
defined in EU legislation but is being gradually elaborated by European 
Commission.4 This concept of “operational independence” is of both 
theoretical and practical interest, having been envisaged mainly as in 
order to avoid prescribing for future Member States how they must in-
stitutionally organise certain tasks, rather allowing them to put in place 
arrangements that are in keeping with their respective constitutional 
and administrative traditions. On a theoretical level, it is an intriguing 
task to examine the constitutive elements of the operational independ-
ence, whilst in practical terms it is challenging for decision makers to 
create models that are capable of complying with the (relatively vague) 
EU integration conditionality criterion. Comparative analysis points to 
three main types of institutional setup for state aid control: control by 
a body that is part of or linked to the Ministry of the Economy and Fi-
nance; state aid control by a body that is also a competition authority; 
finally, and most infrequently, an independent authority. This will be 
addressed in more detail further in the paper.
Within the context of the process of the integration of Republic of 
Serbia into the European Union, and according to the signed SAA,5 Ser-
bia undertook to establish an operationally independent authority vested 
3) For an analysis of the transition from a planned to a market economy, see inter alia: 
Gros, Steinherr (2004). 
4) In the connected area of competition protection, see further: European Commission, 
Commission Staff Working Document Enhancing competition enforcement by 
the Member States’ competition authorities: institutional and procedural issues 
Accompanying the document communication from the commission to the European 
parliament and the council Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 
1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives, {COM(2014) 453}.
5) Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities 
and Their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other 
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with the powers necessary for the full implementation of state aid con-
trol on national level. Serbia must ensure that the state aid authority is 
operationally independent and that it has the powers and resources that 
are necessary for the full and proper application of EU State aid rules. In 
this regard, the Law on State Aid Control (OG RS 51/2009) established 
the Commission for State Aid Control (CSAC). 
The challenges associated with the introduction of the system of state 
aid control in Serbia against the backdrop of enlargement fatigue have 
been considered elsewhere (Milenkovic 2016: page, Milenkovic 2018), 
and this paper will focus on what we find the most pressing problem of 
the Serbian state aid control system: its institutional base. Scholarship 
on state aid in Serbia is still relatively limited, and this paper aims to 
fill this gap building on our previous research in the area.  The paper 
is based on literature review, an examination of the Serbian legislative 
framework along with interviews with officials and experts involved in 
the regime in Serbia for collecting relevant qualitative data. This ena-
bled to get an insight into the most pressing problems associated with 
the process of introducing state aid control along with the challenges 
faced by the institutional structures put in place in order to control and 
sanction government action in this area. The second part of the paper 
explores the context of EU conditionality and the European Commis-
sion’s reporting on the progress of a candidate country. Part three briefly 
describes the basic legal provisions and the current institutional setting 
for state aid control in Serbia. In part four a comparative analysis of 
three different models for the organisation of administrative mecha-
nisms is carried out alongside an analysis of the main features of state 
aid control bodies. Finally, the fifth part, we discuss how best Serbia 
might achieve the standard of operational independence for its state aid 
authority in current societal context. 
Setting the scene – introduction of state aid control in the EU pre-
accession process and “operational independence” of control body
The integration of countries that were partly or predominantly planned 
economies has represented a political challenge for the process of EU in-
tegration since the late 1980s, when it became clear that political changes 
were about to occur, which would have far-reaching consequences for 
both the EU and its Member States (Sedelmemeier and Wallace 2000).6 
6) For an overview of the relations of the EU with the CEE countries, see inter alia: 
Sedelmemeier and Wallace (2000).
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The introduction of the new competition and state aid regimes proved 
to be particularly challenging in the transition process, as the countries 
of Eastern and Central Europe were forced to leave behind the legacy of 
state (over)interference in market relations (Emmert 2003).7 Therefore, 
since the CEE countries had not experienced trade and economic lib-
eralisation after the Second World War,8 the approximation of laws in 
this area has been particularly challenging. All countries acceding to the 
European Union today are obliged to introduce state aid control regimes. 
This was envisaged for the Member States that acceded in 2004 and was 
stipulated in their respective European Agreements (Cremona 2003).9 A 
similar obligation is foreseen for Western Balkan countries through the 
far-reaching Stabilisation and Association agreements mentioned above. 
The political, economic and legal transformation of the Western Balkans 
over the past two decades has been mostly EU-driven. Croatia was the 
first of the Western Balkan countries to join the EU, whilst in the midst 
of enlargement fatigue and experiencing slow economic recovery. How-
ever, it has been clearly stated by the head of the EU Commission that 
no further enlargement is foreseen during the mandate of the current 
Commission, which ends in 2020.10 As has already been stated elsewhere 
(Milenkovic, Milenkovic 2013, Milenkovic 2016 and Milenkovic 2018),11 
the lack of EU prospects will only create more difficulties for Serbia as 
elites will not be fully motivated to implement reforms, and therefore 
conditionality, especially in difficult and challenging fields such as state 
aid, may well fail to bring results. 
The Serbian Stabilisation and Association Agreement contains pro-
visions on the approximation of laws, law enforcement and competition 
rules in line with the structure of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union.12 According to the SAA, Serbia needs to establish an 
operationally independent authority vested with the powers necessary 
7) For some accounts of the transformation of competition regimes in the region, see 
inter alia: Emmert (2003).
8) However, the former Yugoslavia was a notable exception, with its specific Socialist 
self-governance system, which was much more open to foreign trade than the 
countries of the Communist bloc.
9) For state aid provisions in the European agreements and SAAs, see: Cremona 
(2003). The first reference to State aid acquis was in the case of Poland and was 
made as early as 1991 in the European Agreement. (Paczkowska-Tomaszewska, 
Jaros, Winiarski 2006: 669).
10) Eubusiness, “Juncker to halt enlargement as EU Commission head”, 15 July 2014, 
http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/politics-juncker.x29.
11) Milenkovic Milos, Milenkovic Marko (2013 a,b); Milenkovic (2016), Milenkovic 
(2018).
12) For the relevant provisions see further Article 73 SAA. 
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for the full application of state aid rules set out in the Treaty within one 
year from the date of entry into force of this Agreement. This authority 
shall have, inter alia, the powers to authorise state aid schemes and in-
dividual grants of aid as well as powers to order the recovery of state aid 
that has been unlawfully granted. The SAAs require candidate countries 
to develop “operationally independent” bodies charged with the con-
trol of state aid. However, the standard of “operational independence” 
is not defined by EU legislation, and has not been elaborated in case 
law. It is also a matter of debate within academia. As has been argued: 
“the requirement to make the State aid control authority independent 
is included in the association agreements that associated countries have 
signed with the EU. However, these agreements do not specify the con-
ditions of guaranteeing such independence, which leaves a wide scope 
of freedom for national lawmakers. The authority that controls State aid 
must be independent to be able to make objective decisions authorising 
aid schemes and executing their applications. Particularly, it means that 
the authority cannot be dependent upon the organs of administration 
engaged in the granting process, nor upon the beneficiaries of State aid.” 
(Biegurski 2012: 569). Although the criteria have not been defined in 
the area of state aid, the European Commission has elaborated on the 
elements of independence in the context of competition authorities: “In 
order to ensure effective enforcement of the EU competition rules, it is 
generally accepted that NCAs should be independent when exercising 
their functions. Independence means that the authority’s decisions are 
free from external influence and based on the application and interpre-
tation of the competition rules relying on legal and economic arguments. 
In the vast majority of Member States, the NCAs benefit from a certain 
degree of independence but the extent of their independence and equally 
the degree of supervision exercised by other state bodies varies. Many 
NCAs are designated in national law as independent state bodies and 
formally established as either an administrative authority or an agency. 
In addition, around half of the NCAs have legal personality.” (Europe-
an Commission, 2014: 6, para 12). As has been further outlined by the 
EC: “In terms of accountability, which is generally seen as an impor-
tant counterpart for a state body’s independence, almost all NCAs are 
obliged to report on their activities of the previous year, mostly in the 
form of submitting an annual report to the parliament or (part of) the 
executive branch. In addition, some NCAs may have to appear before a 
parliamentary committee or have to submit an annual plan for the up-
coming year.” (European Commission, 2014: 6, para 13). Other useful 
indications from this document include the assertion that: “The vast 
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majority of NCAs also enjoy operational, organisational and financial 
independence. Operational independence is foreseen for most NCAs in 
carrying out their duties, for example, by explicitly excluding interfer-
ence by, or instructions from, other state bodies or other persons when 
investigating and deciding on individual competition cases. The large 
majority of NCAs also decide on their internal organisation and they 
have a separate budget allocation in the overall state budget for which 
they have budgetary autonomy to spend. …” (European Commission, 
2014: 7, para 15). Based on feedback received from stakeholders through 
qualitative research, it is possible for the purpose of CSAC, but also for 
other independent controllers, to define the following characteristics of 
“operational independence”: 1. the ability to take decisions independent-
ly, free from political interference and freedom from any requirement to 
seek or receive instructions from any government, or other institution, 
body, office or entity; 2.   the ability to exercise powers transparently and 
impartially, with appropriate rules on conflict of interests; 3. adequate 
and stable human and financial resources; 4. full authority over the re-
cruitment and management of staff; 5. a separate annual budget with 
autonomy over the spending of the budget allocated; 6. management/
board selected according to transparent procedures on the basis of merit. 
Role and position of the Serbian Commission for State Aid Control 
A few measures in the field of state aid were taken over the years 
prior to the introduction of the regime in the country. The National 
Reports on State Aid, which Serbia has comprised since 2004, point to a 
relatively high level of state aid as a proportion of GDP.13 Following the 
enactment of the Law on State Aid (after the  process lasted for several 
years), the basic substantive, procedural and institutional rules were put 
in place. It was envisaged that the Government would form a State Aid 
Control Commission entrusted with controlling all individual state aid 
measures and schemes. According to the law, no aid may be granted 
without a prior decision by the Commission. The Law on State Aid was 
adopted in July 2009 and entered into force on 1 January 2010. As was 
prescribed, the law was to be implemented from that date, leaving very 
little time for the necessary institutional preparations (Dajkovic 2010).14 
13) For years, it has amounted to more than 2% of GDP as compared to the 0.5% 
usually granted through subsidies in EU Member States. Reports are available in 
English at: http://www.kkdp.gov.rs/eng/izvestaji.php 
14) For the overview of the Law see: Dajkovic (2010).
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According to the Law, the members of the Commission for State Aid 
Control were appointed in December 2009 by a governmental decision 
only a few days before the planned start date for implementation the 
new regime in the country. The Law itself largely transposes the provi-
sions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and de-
fines state aid according to the established approach of the Commission 
and the Court of Justice. However, there are still a number of changes 
to be made in order to ensure full alignment with EU law. European 
Commission 2016: 38) The Law does not contain detailed substantive 
norms on the types of aid that are compatible/allowed. These are laid 
down in detail in the Regulation on the Rules for the Granting of State 
Aid. As was explained by the interviewees who were involved in the 
drafting of the law, the intention was to keep the law relatively “short 
and simple” and to allow for the substantive provisions to be amended 
more frequently in order to ensure compliance in line with regulatory 
changes in the European Union.
The Serbian state aid authority is a hybrid body – an independent 
commission entrusted with control tasks, but without a separate budget 
or administrative capacity (Transparency Serbia 2015).15 This body has 
been entrusted with controlling state aid measures until Serbia’s prospec-
tive accession to the European Union, when this obligation will cease to 
apply and the power to scrutinise state aid measures will transfer to the 
European Commission. Accordingly, most bodies described further in 
the text ceased to exist or fundamentally changed their role upon entry 
in the EU. The Commission has no legal personality, and no budget or 
separate administrative capacities, but is served by the Ministry of Fi-
nance (Department for State Aid) (Milenkovic 2016: page).16 Members 
of the Commission are proposed by relevant ministries, along with one 
member by the Commission for the Protection of Competition, and are 
appointed for a five-year period according to the governmental deci-
sion. This institutional design, under which the Commission is over-
whelmingly dependent on the Ministry of Finance (and other grantors 
of state aid due to the specifics of the appointment procedures), has ev-
idently led to general weakness and difficulties in meeting the standard 
of operational independence (Botta 2013 and Popovic, Caka 2017).17 
15) For the comprehensive account of problems of the state aid control system see 
further: Transparency Serbia (2015).
16) For the detailed overview of CSAC and Ministry department competences see 
further: Milenkovic (2016).
17) This however is not surprising, but is rather recognised as a trend in all countries in 
the region, see: Botta (2013), Popovic, Caka (2017).
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Under the Law (Article 6), the Commission has five members and is set 
up by the Government. Its members are elected by the Government acting 
upon proposals from: the ministry responsible for finances; the ministry 
responsible for the economy and regional development; the ministry re-
sponsible for infrastructure; the ministry responsible for environmental 
protection; and the Commission for the Protection of Competition. Mem-
bers of the Commission are appointed for terms of five years and may be 
reappointed. The representative of the ministry responsible for finances 
is, at the same time, also the Chairperson of the Commission, and the 
representative of the Commission for the Protection of Competition is the 
Deputy Chairperson. “Representative” is the very formulation used in the 
Serbian version of the Law. In our opinion, it reflects the approach taken 
by lawmakers forming a control body representative of the biggest gran-
tors of aid. The conditions for membership of the Commission are: Ser-
bian citizenship and “at least a university degree”; in addition, members 
must “possess expert knowledge in the field of state aid, competition, and/
or EU legislation.”18 The Commission is explicitly defined as “operational-
ly independent” and is also entrusted with adopting its rules of procedure. 
However, it does not have separate budget. The Law provides that funds 
for the Commission’s activities shall be provided from the budget of the 
Republic of Serbia, and that the Ministry shall provide the premises and 
other technical resources for the Commission’s activities. (Article 7) 
The current CSAC secretariat is based in the Ministry of Finance 
within the Department for State Aid. According to the organisational 
arrangement of civil servants within the Ministry it is envisaged that 
8 civil servants/employees will be allocated to the sector. According to 
data obtained from the CSAC, the Department currently has 8 employ-
ees, and was the only one excluded from the mandatory reduction of 
employees during the implementation of austerity measures from 2014. 
As the interviewees attest, the Commission, along with the Department 
as its secretariat, has a constant need for new employees in order to meet 
the demands of the increasing workload. These officers are charged 
with handling notifications and preparing draft decisions for the CSAC 
as well as taking inventories and drafting reports for the Government. 
As was outlined by a majority of the stakeholders interviewed and some 
of the members of the CSAC during previous research project carried 
out by author, even though significant experience has been gained by 
administrative staff and capacities have been developed, this is still not 
sufficient to meet the demands of the workload.
18) This provision is becoming obsolete as there is now a critical mass of professionals 
with expertise in the area of state aid.
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The Law did establish mechanisms for resolving conflicts of interest, 
as members of the Commission are de iure  representatives of the minis-
tries, which are the largest grantors of state aid. Members are obliged to 
respect the provisions of the law governing the prevention of conflicts of 
interest in the discharge of their public functions. Furthermore, it is stip-
ulated that member of the Commission who is at the same time a repre-
sentative of the grantor or state aid, or the body proposing the regulation 
establishing grounds for the grant of state aid, may provide additional 
information within the state aid control procedure but shall not have the 
right to take part in the decision-making process (Article 21).19 The in-
terviewees confirm that this rule has been adhered to within the practice 
of the Commission, although control is still left to the group of “repre-
sentatives” of the biggest grantors of aid, which need to be controlled. 
Finally, the Law contains provisions on reporting (Article 23). Based 
on the information collected from grantors of state aid, the Ministry (not 
the Commission) prepares the proposal for the annual report on state aid 
granted in the Republic of Serbia, which the Commission submits to the 
Government only (and not to Parliament). The Ministry also specifies in 
detail the methodology for drafting the annual report, the deadline for 
the submission of data to the Ministry, and the deadline for the submis-
sion of the draft the annual report. By this way, the procedure remains to 
the great extent Ministry driven. To sum up, the Law has established the 
“operationally independent” body but without legal personality, separate 
budget, administration/secretariat and overall dependant on the gran-
tors of the aid. Therefore, it is interesting to study comparative examples 
from former (and current) EU candidate countries.
State aid authorities during the EU accession process from a 
comparative respective
There are in principle three types of institutional settings for state 
aid control within the transitional context of EU accession.20 Each type 
of administrative organisation of state aid related tasks has its advan-
19) The Commission may also invite representatives of other authorities, organisations 
and professional associations to provide further information that is relevant to decision 
making. In terms of the provision of information, a representative of the grantor of 
state aid, or the body proposing the regulation establishing grounds for the grant of 
state aid, who is not a member of the Commission, is entitled to participate in the state 
aid control procedure in order to provide additional information. (Article 21).
20) Here we mostly concentrate on former candidates who have since joined the 
European Union.
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tages and disadvantages, as the more detailed national studies citied in 
this paper attest (Botta 2013).21 Therefore, in identifying the appropriate 
form for the institutional structure of state aid control, national specif-
icities must be taken into account – including in particular the stage 
within the transition process reached by the country in question, the 
level of economic reforms implemented  prior to the enactment of the 
state aid reforms, the role of independent bodies within the legal system 
as well as the overall societal and political context.
The first model is one in which the control body is part of or, or 
linked to, the national Finance/Economy Ministry. This has been a 
widely used approach in transitional economies. It also reflects  the cur-
rent legislative choice in Serbia. This model has usually included the 
establishment of a separate Commission in charge of state aid control, 
with some administrative tasks being carried out by the Ministry of 
Economy / Finance. A major challenge within this model has been the 
involvement of the Finance Ministry in certain aspects of the work of 
the control body, and especially in some monitoring stages and/or the 
control process. It has been argued that this model introduces a number 
of risks for independence, mostly due to the fact that members are pro-
posed or appointed by grantors of state aid (Biegurski 2012: 570). Com-
missions that meet on an ad hoc basis, the decisions of which are drafted 
by supporting offices, may be open to influence (Biegurski 2012: 570). 
We have identified four examples of this model in current EU Member 
States that have passed through the transitional process, and a further 
three in current candidate countries. 
Slovenia established the Commission for State Aid Control in 2000, 
and by the same legal act the State Aid Control Section was established 
to carry out “specialist, administrative and technical tasks for the Com-
mission” within Ministry of the Economy and Finance (Jagodic Le-
kocevic, Pelka, Vosu 2004).22 Due to the close cooperation between col-
leagues from the Serbian and Slovenian Finance Ministries, this model 
had been used for establishing the Serbian CSAC.23 Upon accession to 
the EU, the Commission ceased to exist and remaining national compe-
tences were transferred to the Ministry of Finance.
Estonia offers a further example of a new Member State that com-
plied with the obligation under the European Agreement with the Euro-
pean Community by establishing Competition and State Aid divisions 
21) Boota asseses that state aid control at national level is unsuitable and pointing to 
need for a  supranational control even before accession, see further: Botta (2013).
22) See further: Jagodic Lekocevic, Pelka, Vosu (2004). 
23) The Serbian Government at the time was advised by Slovenian expert.
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within the Ministry of Finance. Notifications were made directly to 
the Minister and the relevant state aid rules were incorporated into the 
Competition Act (Jagodic Lekocevic, Pelka, Vosu 2004:382).
Hungary established a Monitoring Authority within its Ministry of 
Finance, which was operational from 1996-1999. The State Aid Moni-
toring Office (SAMO) was established in 1999 but was also incorporated 
into the Ministry of Finance (Hargita, Filep 2004: 585), making it a rath-
er unique model, which operated within the core governmental struc-
ture until accession to the EU. The same body remained a competent 
national authority for state aid following accession to the EU in 2004.
Latvia established a State Aid Surveillance Commission in 1997. It 
was an “independent collegiate institution: not subject to any Ministry 
and consisted of 13 representatives delegated by different institutions 
who met whenever needed to consider notified State aid projects” (Bed-
nar 2005: 267). Following the first phase in which the Commission had a 
permanent secretariat within the Ministry of Finance (with competence 
similar to a department within a Serbian ministry), “on January 2002 an 
independent State Aid Control Division/Department was created and 
acted as secretariat to the Commission” (Bednar 2005: 268).24 The insti-
tutional setup of state aid control has changed since accession to the EU; 
today, the national point of contact for state aid in Latvia is again the 
Ministry of Finance.25 Such experience in institutional transformation 
from 2002 onwards may be useful for Serbian decision makers in order 
to achieve the standard of “operational independence”. As regards the 
current candidate countries Montenegro (Lagzdina, Kurtagic, 2015)26 
and Albania,27 both have opted to establish state aid commissions with 
tasks partially done  by the Ministry of Finance. 
The second most frequently used institutional option was the com-
petition authority as a state aid authority, which has also been a widely 
used institutional option within the transitional context. It is claimed to 
have a number of advantages (Biegurski 2012: 569). As the protection 
of competition is regularly ensured by an independent authority with 
its own legal personality, an administrative structure separate from the 
central administration and an independent budget, this forms a solid 
24) However, no further data are available in the literature on the exact composition and 
organisation of this independent secretariat. 
25) The list of all current national state aid contact points in Member States is available 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/contacts.html.
26) For an overview of the challenges see: Lagzdina, Kurtagic, (2015)
27) Gjevori points to similar problems faced by the Albanian State Aid Commission 
to those of the CSAC in Serbia, questioning this concept of “independence within 
government”. (Gjevori 2014: 18).
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basis for creating an independent “watchdog” to oversee the grant of 
state aid in the country. 
In Lithuania the Competition Council (Competition and Consumer 
Protection Office before 2000) was entrusted with state aid control. This 
autonomous body was also charged with drawing up procedural rules 
and criteria for accessing state aid in the country. After accession to the 
EU, this body has retained its role in the notification procedure (Bednar 
2005: 269-271).
In Poland, prior to accession, state aid control was carried out by the 
President of the Office for Competition and Consumer Protection (ap-
pointed as an authority in 2000), whose term was fixed but which was 
also subordinated to the Prime Minister (Paczkowska-Tomaszewska, 
Krzysztof, Krzysztof 2006: 669-670).
In Romania, state aid control was entrusted to an autonomous au-
thority – the Competition Council – from 1999, but with some tasks 
performed by the Competition Office within the Ministry of Finance. 
Many similarities with Serbia can be observed within that period with 
regard to the weak track record and EC complaints (von Borriers 2006: 
510-511).
The Czech Republic is another country which charged its Office for 
the Protection of Competition with the function of state aid control 
prior to accession to the European Union; after accession, this office 
became the central national authority for coordination, advice, consul-
tation, and monitoring in the area of state aid (Bednar 2005: 265).
Croatia serves as a valuable comparative model for examination, as it 
was the first state from former Yugoslavia that opted to implement its state 
aid control requirement through the Croatian Agency for Competition in 
2003.28 According to the Law, the Agency had very broad powers; it was 
deciding on the compatibility of state aid through ex ante and ex post con-
trol and also had the power to order the repayment of unlawful aid. Upon 
accession to the EU, the competences in this area were transferred to the 
Ministry of Finance (Botta 2013:88-90).29 In addition to Croatia, Macedo-
nia is the only country of the WB region that has opted for entrusting state 
aid control to the Commission for the protection of Competition since 
2006, having previously used the model of 3 members state aid commis-
sion aided by the Ministry of finance (Biegurski 2012: 568).
28) Law on State Aid, Official Gazette no 140/05. According to the interviewees, the 
example of the Croatian institutional setup is regularly pointed to, unofficially, as 
a useful example for the remaining candidate countries from the Western Balkans, 
including Serbia.
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The third model – an independent state aid authority – has been 
the least widely used among the former EU accession countries. Ac-
cording to available data, authorities with considerable independence 
and responsibility solely for state aid control were only introduced in 
Slovakia and Cyprus. Slovakia established its Office for State Aid in 
199930 which was a separate agency for state aid control (Biegurski 
2012: 571).31 According to the Slovakian Law, the State Aid Office was 
set up as the body of the state administration responsible for the review, 
evaluation and approval of state aid, control of its provision and the 
keeping of records in relation to state aid. 
In Cyprus the specific model of state aid control was introduced 
within the context of the EU integration process in 2001; the body 
charged with the task of controlling state aid was the Office of the 
Commissioner for Public Aid (Andreou 2005: 27).32 This institution is 
a very valuable comparative example as it is still operational, albeit 
with a different role following the accession of Cyprus to the European 
Union. The Office is headed by a Commissioner (for public/state aid). 
The Cypriot Commissioner for State Aid Control is an “independent 
government official”. He/she is appointed by the Council of Ministers 
in consultation with the Parliamentary Committee on European Affairs, 
and has a term in office of six years.
In the Western Balkan region, only Bosnia and Herzegovina has opt-
ed to establish a fully independent institution for state aid control – the 
State Aid Council of BiH. The council is served by its own secretariat.33
As experiences from the previous rounds of enlargement indicate, 
there are numerous challenges in achieving operational independence 
when the state aid body is located within or connected to the govern-
ment, and therefore the position of regulator with independent legal 
status (irrespective of whether it is entrusted with powers in only one 
or more regulatory fields) and a clearly defined mandate may be an im-
portant guarantee of the achievement of the policy goals envisaged by 
association treaties. Both the interviewees and a study of the compar-
30) Law No.231/1999.
31) For some criticism of the functioning of institution see: Biegurski (2012: 571).
32) Public Aid Control Law (Law 30(Ι)/2001) which entered into force on 30 April 
2001 following the decision of the Council of Ministers no.53.538 of 11 April 2001. 
On 29 April 2004 the State Aid Control (Amendment) Law of 2004 was passed 
and the Commissioner’s title was changed from Commissioner for Public Aid to 
Commissioner for State Aid Control, and the name of institution was changed to 
Office of the Commissioner for State Aid Control. See further: www.publicaid.gov.
cy/; (Andreou 2005: 27).
33) See further: www.szdp.gov.ba/en/.
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ative literature indicate that it is of the utmost importance for the state 
aid authority to demonstrate competence, integrity vis-à-vis grantors, 
and persistence in pursuing agendas that might be at odds with political 
interests and also to act according the goals of competition policy as 
defined by the acquis and the respective national legislation.
How to achieve the standard of operational independence of the 
state aid authority within a given societal context: some findings 
from qualitative research
In this part we examine how this criterion of operational independ-
ence can be achieved in the Serbian context. The results of our research 
indicate that the current model has significant shortcomings and has 
reached its limits in ensuring the independence of the watchdog body 
(Milenkovic 2016 and Milenkovic 2018).34 Therefore, further explora-
tion is needed into the options for the new institutional setup of state 
aid control, taking account of two models previously used that included 
autonomy of the authority from the state aid grantors: control by the 
competition authority or oversight of state aid by an independent body. 
At this point, we stress that no specific model for the administrative 
organisation of state aid control body can guarantee the success of an 
independent authority in scrutinising grantors’ actions. Based on this 
comparative analysis and the qualitative research results, and having re-
gard to the political, legal, and societal context in the country, we con-
sider the establishment of a state aid authority with both operational 
and organisational independence to be the most appropriate model.35 
What are the main features of a position of the state aid authorities and 
how can their independence be secured? As our research points out, it is of 
the utmost importance to ensure separate legal personality for the state aid 
authority, either by tasking this control to competition authorities (which 
have a similar position in many European legal systems) or by establishing 
separate administrative organisations with legal personality. This feature 
of independence should be combined with other attributes including but 
not limiting to: 1. separate budget, 2. fixed term appointment of the indi-
vidual or collective body leading the organisation, 3. conflict of interest 
provisions preventing interference by the central government and other 
grantors of state aid, and 4. separate administrative service/secretariat.
34) See further: Milenkovic (2016, 2018).
35) Here we depart to some extent from the opinion in Milenkovic (2016) were we 
argued that powers should be transferred to the competition authority.
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The Serbian commission has already been defined as independent by 
the Law on State Aid Control and this status only needs to be strength-
ened through a few legislative changes. This could include granting legal 
personality, the establishment of a separate budget and own secretariat 
entrusted with all of the specialist, administrative and technical tasks 
necessary for the operation of the Commission, the election and release 
from the position of the CSAC members, who should be accountable to 
the Parliament. 
Although the competence of the state aid authority changes signifi-
cantly following the country’s accession to the EU (with the transfer of 
the powers to the European Commission), the administrative capacities 
of the SA authority may continue to perform an advisory role and in-
dependently oversee the preparation of notifications to the European 
Commission and the implementation of block exemptions by the (new) 
Member State authorities. 
There are also some disadvantages to this option within the given le-
gal and social context. The creation of new public agencies has ceased to 
be a preferred policy option for Serbian governments over the past few 
years, even though there are a large number of such regulatory and con-
trol institutions in the Serbian administrative system, which were estab-
lished between 2001 and 2012 (Milenkovic and Milenkovic 2013b).36 
If given full independence, this option would in practice require the 
establishment of a new institution, most probably the transfer of ad-
ministrative staff form the Ministry and the adoption of new internal 
rules of conduct. It would also raise other standard issues and potential 
challenges associated with the establishment and (re)commencement of 
the work of the institution. The appointment of members is an impor-
tant feature of the independence of the institution. As the current CSAC 
members are appointed by the government, their position may not be 
considered to be sufficiently independent. Therefore, the election of 
the Commission members by Parliament, preceded by a parliamentary 
hearing, would be a more suitable option.
The legal transformation of transitional societies is commonly 
achieved by transferring or introducing models and norms that have 
already been implemented within the same regulatory areas in different 
countries. However, in Serbian case, the existing domestic model of the 
Commission for the Protection of Competition (CPC) could be used to 
redefine the position of the CSAC, since it has already been positively 
evaluated by the European Union in the context of EU integration. As 
the CPC already displays some important features of independence, this 
36) See further Milenkovic and Milenkovic (2013b).
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paper outlines those that could be used to enhance it and fulfil the crite-
rion of operational independence. According to the Law, the CPC is an 
independent and autonomous organisation exercising public powers in 
accordance with this Law. The Commission has a status of a legal entity. 
The Commission is accountable for its work to the National Assembly, 
which elects president and members and to which it submits an Annual 
Report on its activities (Article 20). Therefore, this body represents a 
viable domestic model which can be used for reconfiguring the state aid 
authority. The transfer of powers to the CPC at this moment might com-
promise the exercise of core antitrust powers and therefore it is better to 
use its expertise and experience in order to establish a new independent 
state aid authority. Finally, similarly to Competition authority, it would 
be advisable to members of the state aid authority to commit themselves 
full time to this public post and not to engage in other work.37
Concluding remarks
Serbia has come a long way in transforming its legal system within 
the context of EU integration, and there is no doubt that the state aid 
regime in Serbia is a direct consequence of the EU’s influence, and  a 
prime example of conditionality put into practice. Even in the context of 
enlargement fatigue and given the distant membership prospects, there 
is value in introducing this control system into the economies of the 
Western Balkans, including that of Serbia. It comes as no surprise that 
(successive) governments have worked on harmonising national legis-
lation with the EU acquis, although have not made any extra efforts to 
introduce a new competitive dynamic into the transitional market. This 
would require both the Government to be restraint and the develop-
ment of a culture of integrity and impartiality by control institutions. 
Given the available EU assessments, and on the basis of the law as it 
currently stands, it may be concluded that the existing administrative 
arrangement as provided by the Law does not meet at least four out of 
six standards of “operational independence” outlined in part two.
As outlined in part four, no specific model for the administrative 
organisation of state aid control authorities is able to provide a guaran-
tee of the success of the independent authority in scrutinising grantors’ 
actions. Models need to be contextualised and adapted accordingly in 
37) Save for professors and researchers, which are traditionally exempted and whose 
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each country. The goal of the operational independence of the CSAC (or 
any other body entrusted with state aid control) can only be achieved 
if the conditions are created for the state aid control mechanism to act 
professionally, basing its decisions on expertise and by enhancing the 
role of the control body in this area. Although independent institution 
model has rarely been used, compared to the other policy options it 
appears to be more suitable within a given societal context. Considering 
that the CPC is already a functional model within the Serbian system, 
and that its track record is viewed positively, it could be used alongside 
comparative best practice examples in order to redefine the CSAC posi-
tion. Since the model of the CPC was recommended as a good example 
upon which the rearranged CSAC could be structured, it would also be 
beneficial to draw on the experience gained in the development of the 
CPC, including internal acts, administrative practices, etc. in expanding 
the capacities of the state aid control mechanism. Whatever institutional 
setting is chosen the state aid authority to demonstrate its independence 
from grantors, competence in the field and willingness to pursue con-
trol in line with the criteria set by the acquis and the relevant national 
legislation even when needed to confront with the Government actions. 
Finally, this analysis is concluded by pointing to the potentially in-
triguing concept of “operational independence” as developed through 
the work of the European Commission, which deserves greater atten-
tion in the EU and administrative law scholarship. The vagueness of the 
concept however allows for different constitutional and administrative 
traditions to adapt newly emerging regulatory functions within their 
respective legal and political contexts.
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